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35 
THE FOX IS GUARDING THE HENHOUSE: ENHANCING 
THE ROLE OF THE EPA IN FONSI DETERMINATIONS 
PURSUANT TO NEPA 
Wendy B. Davis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal agencies, which lack environmental expertise, and whose 
mission is not environmental protection, should not have the power to 
determine whether their proposed projects will harm the environment. 
Agencies with environmental expertise, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), should be involved in the environmental 
assessment process. Foreseeable adverse environmental impact should 
result in a judicial finding that any proposed action pursuant to an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is arbitrary and capricious. 
When enacted in 1969, The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)1 was to be “the most important and far-reaching conservation-
environmental measure ever acted upon by the Congress. . . . [It] is a 
congressional declaration that we do not intend . . . to initiate actions 
which endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind . . . .”2  
Since its enactment, NEPA has proven to be little more than a 
procedural hurdle, with no impact on the substantive outcome of 
proposed federal projects. 
Pursuant to NEPA, when a federal agency proposes a project that 
may have a significant environmental impact, the proposing agency 
becomes the lead agency, with authority to (a) determine whether any 
significant environmental impact will result from the project, (b) draft 
 
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. The author is grateful to Albany Law 
School for a research grant and to the following students of Albany Law School for excellent 
research assistance: Willow Baer, Joshua Choi, and Scott Lukowski. The author also wishes to 
express gratitude to Prof. Timothy Lytton of Albany Law School for insightful comments on an 
early draft of this article. 
 1. Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-75 (1970). 
 2. 115 CONG. REC. 40,415, 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson). 
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the EIS, and (c) determine the best alternatives to the project.3 Even if 
this federal agency has no environmental expertise, the agency will have 
authority to decide (a) whether the project will result in a major federal 
action with a significant environmental impact so that an EIS is required, 
(b) what other federal agencies, if any, may cooperate and assist in the 
preparation of the EIS, and (c) whether to continue with the project 
notwithstanding the disapproval of environmental experts or the 
predicted adverse environmental impact.4 
For example, if the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
proposes an airport expansion, the FAA, as lead agency, has the 
authority to determine whether the project will have any significant 
environmental impact. An Environmental Assessment (EA) will be 
prepared to make this determination.5  If the FAA decides that its airport 
expansion project will have no significant environmental impact, then 
the NEPA process ends, unless this determination is challenged in court. 
Thus, the federal agencies charged with protecting the environment and 
our natural resources, such as the EPA, the National Forest Service, the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the National Park Service 
(NPS), would have no input and have no authority to approve or curtail 
the proposed project. This hypothetical was taken from a 1996 Tenth 
Circuit case, in which the Court found an FAA Finding of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI) not arbitrary and capricious, although the 
determination was made with no input from the EPA, FWS, or other 
environmental experts.6 
If the FAA determines that there may be a significant 
environmental impact, the FAA can decide which, if any, other federal 
agencies should be allowed to participate in the preparation of the EIS.7 
Even with the participation of other agencies, the FAA may decide that 
the concerns or objections of these cooperating agencies are less 
important than the completion of the proposed project.  The FAA may 
proceed notwithstanding the protests of any other agency, and 
notwithstanding any prediction of environmental harm, no matter how 
 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2005). For a discussion of when an action is a federal action, see Enos 
v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1985), where portions of a joint project between the 
state of Hawaii and the Army Corps of Engineers were deemed not to be federal action, thus the 
environmental effects of shoreside facilities funded by the state were held to be properly excluded 
from the EIS. 
         4.    40 CFR §§ 1501.4 – 1506. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Airport Neighbor’s Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 7. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a). 
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dire.8 Courts will defer to these decisions of the FAA, or any lead 
agency, even if other agencies have expressed concerns, unless the court 
finds their actions to be arbitrary or capricious.9 The judicial standard of 
review is discussed in section II below.10 
The final EIS is filed with the EPA.11 The EPA has authority to 
review the EIS, and may refer issues to the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) if the EPA determines that the proposed action is 
detrimental to public health, welfare, or environmental quality.12 The 
EPA is not required to evaluate an EA or FONSI.  The author suggests 
that the EPA and other appropriate environmental protection agencies 
should be more involved in the NEPA process, particularly in the EA 
leading to FONSI determinations.13 If the EPA does not recommend the 
proposed action, then the lead agency should be prohibited from taking 
such action. The EPA should have authority to require preparation of an 
EIS when a FONSI has been issued. 
As noted by the Federal District Court of Minnesota, “NEPA does 
not require, or even contemplate, that decision makers will be 
completely impartial. In fact, NEPA assumes that institutional biases 
will exist. . . .”14  These shortcomings of NEPA were noted and debated 
in Congress at the time NEPA was enacted. During the Senate debates, 
Senator Muskie stated: 
The concept of self-policing by Federal agencies which pollute or 
license pollution is contrary to the philosophy and intent of existing 
environmental quality legislation. In hearing after hearing agencies of 
the Federal Government have argued that their primary authorization, 
whether it be maintenance of the navigable waters by the Corps of 
Engineers or licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy 
Commission, takes precedence over water quality requirements . . . 
 
 8. See Wendy B. Davis and Rebecca Clarke, Hot Air: Undue Judicial Deference to Federal 
Aviation Administration Expertise in Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 709 (2004) (discussing the environmental harm caused by aviation and the failure of the 
FAA to prevent such harm, and the deference by federal courts to such FAA decisions). 
 9. See, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 398 F.3d 
105, 114 (1st Cir. 2005).  
       10.   See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA procedures). 
 11. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.9. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 7609. 
 13. The process currently in place for compliance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (2005), may be an effective model for NEPA. The Act’s required 
consultation with FWS experts, and the creation of the Endangered Species Committee pursuant to 
16 U.S.C. § 1536, may serve as an example of a way to ensure knowledgeable environmental 
evaluation. Further comparison is beyond the scope of this article. 
 14. Residents in Protest–I-35E v. Dole, 583 F. Supp. 653, 661 (D. Minn. 1984). 
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The proposed compromise language developed for section 102 (c) 
clearly indicates the extent to which the polluter is involved in 
determining environmental effects. This language eliminated the 
requirement that a “finding” be made but provides that environmental 
impact be discussed as a part of any report on legislation, or any 
decision to commence a major activity. The requirement that 
established environmental agencies be consulted and that their 
comments accompany any such report would place the environmental 
control responsibility where it should be.15  
The EPA, an “established environmental agency,” as described by 
Senator Muskie, should have concurrent or dual authority with other 
federal agencies regarding implementation of actions affecting the 
environment pursuant to NEPA. At a minimum, the EPA should be 
required to approve any FONSI. This suggestion may require an 
amendment to the NEPA statute,16 or could be implemented by judicial 
action. EPA involvement in this manner is not without precedent; in the 
2003 Fifth Circuit case of Spiller v. White, the EPA and Department of 
Transportation acted as co-lead agencies.17 The author suggests that this 
type of dual authority by the EPA with other lead agencies should be 
required, at least at the stage of preparing an EA that may lead to a 
FONSI.18 
As an alternative to amending the statute, a similar result could be 
achieved if courts were more willing to find agency decisions made 
without appropriate environmental expertise to be arbitrary and 
capricious. The party challenging agency action must prove that the 
agency decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”19  This standard of high 
deference to agency determinations was set forth in the leading case of 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.20 In 
Chevron, the Court considered a review of an EPA order pursuant to the 
 
 15. 115 CONG. REC. S-29052-53 (Oct. 8, 1969) (Emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
 16. The federal legislature has authority to delegate rulemaking, enforcement, investigatory, 
and other powers to federal agencies.  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979). The 
regulatory power of agencies is limited to the express grant of authority in an authorizing or 
empowering statute, and therefore an amendment to NEPA would be required to implement these 
suggestions. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Sweet v. Sheehan, 235 
F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2000); Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 17. Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2003). 
       18.   See generally, Patricia E. Salkin, Integrating Local Waterfront Revitalization Planning 
into Local Comprehensive Planning and Zoning, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 207 (2005) (discussing 
the need for coordination between state and local government to enhance development of waterfront 
projects while preserving coastal resources). 
 19. See Welch v. U.S. Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 810 (N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated by 
Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass’n v. FAA, 116 F. App’x 3, 7, 10 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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Clean Air Act.21 The Court upheld the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean 
Air Act, stating “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer. . . .”22 It is important to note that Chevron involved an 
interpretation of a statute, the Clean Air Act by the EPA, the sole agency 
charged with administering the statute. Under current law, FONSI 
determinations, and decisions made pursuant to a NEPA EIS are not 
decisions made by the EPA as the sole agency charged with 
administration of NEPA. FONSI determinations are decisions made by 
diverse lead agencies with missions that may be contrary to the goals of 
NEPA. Hence, Chevron deference is not appropriate in NEPA cases and, 
in fact, Chevron is rarely cited in NEPA suits.23 
The D.C. District Court has been willing to acknowledge a reduced 
standard of deference. In Hammond v. Norton,24 the D.C. District stated 
that it does not “owe any deference to [the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM)’s] interpretation of NEPA or CEQ regulations because NEPA is 
addressed to all federal agencies and Congress did not entrust 
administration of NEPA to the BLM alone.”25 Because a FONSI 
determination requires an interpretation of NEPA, other courts should be 
more willing to grant less deference to lead agencies that lack 
environmental expertise. A lesser degree of judicial deference may be 
sufficient to alleviate the problem without overburdening the EPA or 
increasing the bureaucracy. 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Chevron, courts continue to 
accord significant deference to lead agency determinations, upholding 
these decisions unless they are proven to be arbitrary and capricious. 
This deference is not appropriate because the FAA, the Department of 
Transportation, and other lead agencies are not experts in environmental 
protection or preservation, and may have a mission that is contrary to 
these goals.  The lead agency is not required to obtain the approval of 
the EPA, the FWS, or other appropriate federal or state environmental 
experts in making these decisions. Any decision made by a lead agency 
that is contrary to the advice of the EPA should be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious by the courts. 
 
 21. Id. at 840. 
 22. Id. at 844. 
 23. See generally, Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005) (suggesting the cost-benefit analysis should be 
rejected in environmental issues in favor of a trumping approach). 
 24. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 239 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 25. Id. at 239. 
5
Davis: EPA's Role in FONSI Determinations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
DAVIS1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:15:48 AM 
40 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:35 
This article suggests an enhanced role for the EPA and the other 
agencies that have authority to protect our natural resources, including 
the FWS, NPS, and others. These agencies should have authority to 
evaluate the environmental assessments leading to a FONSI and require 
preparation of an EIS pursuant to NEPA.26 This paper also suggests that 
these agencies need more authority in the substantive decision of choice 
of an alternative action pursuant to the EIS, and the determination of 
whether the proposed action should proceed based on the conclusions in 
the EIS. This could be accomplished with an amendment to the statute; 
however, the Author acknowledges that this would necessitate an 
increase in the EPA budget and potentially significantly more 
bureaucratic time and effort for construction projects. It should be noted 
that the current NEPA procedure may be less cost efficient than the 
Author’s suggestion.  Centralization of such environmental analysis in 
the EPA is likely to result in significant cost savings, although the 
budget would be shifted from other agencies to the EPA.  
Other scholars who have suggested ways to make NEPA more 
effective, such as monitoring and post-completion evaluation, have 
grappled with these same problems.27 Another alternative would be for 
courts to show less deference to non-environmental lead agencies,  and 
find that lead agency action that is contradictory to the recommendations 
of the environmental agencies is arbitrary and capricious. 
Environmental litigation involves policy issues that are appropriate 
for courts to decide. Policymaking should not be restricted to the 
legislature, but rather the enactment of NEPA and other environmental 
protection statutes should encourage and guide courts in deciding 
controversies with public policy implications. The courts and the 
legislature should play complementary roles in environmental 
protection.28 
II.  NEPA PROCEDURES 
NEPA requires federal agencies proposing major actions 
 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
 27. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 939-40 (2002) (suggesting 
that follow-up monitoring of actual impacts, adaptive mitigation, and environmental management 
systems would make NEPA more effective); see also Sinden, supra note 23. 
 28. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000) (advocating for the tort system to play a complementary 
role in policy making for gun control). 
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significantly affecting the human environment to prepare an EIS.29  
Agencies will first prepare an EA to determine whether an EIS is 
required or whether a FONSI is appropriate.30  There are one hundred 
times as many FONSIs issued as EISs, Federal agencies produce 
approximately 500 EISs annually, and nearly 50,000 FONSIs, and the 
ratio is increasing.31 This indicates that many agencies may be 
underreporting environmental impact. 32 
Once a FONSI determination has been made, the project may 
proceed, unless challenged in court by an environmental group or 
concerned citizens. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)33 provides 
for judicial review of agency action. The Supreme Court set the standard 
for deference to agency interpretations of the statutes administered by 
those agencies in Chevron.34 In reviewing a FONSI determination, 
courts differ on the standard of review. Some early courts applied a 
“reasonableness” standard to the agency’s decision that no EIS was 
required,35 asking whether the agency “reasonably concluded that the 
project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences.”36 
A court applying the reasonableness standard is more likely to disagree 
with a FONSI and require an EIS.37 More recently, following the 
Supreme Court decision in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council,38 most Federal Courts of Appeals, including the D.C., First, 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts, 
have set aside the determination only if it was “arbitrary and 
capricious.”39 The Eighth Circuit still applies a “reasonableness” 
 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 30. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c), 1501.3 (2004). 
 31. Id. at 920. 
 32. Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 909-910. 
 33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2000). 
 34. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  
 35. Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Ass’n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 36. See California v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(citation omitted). 
 37. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1991). 
 38. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (applying an “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review). 
 39. Town of Cave Creek, Ariz. v. FAA, 325 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Pearson v. 
Powell, 96 F. App’x 466, 467 (9th Cir. 2004); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1330 
(9th Cir. 1992); Citizens for Mobility v. Mineta, 119 F. App’x 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2004); Alliance to 
Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 114 (1st Cir. 2005); Soc’y 
Hill Tower Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000); Spiller v. White, 352 
F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2003); Friends of the Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 61 F.3d 501, 
506 (6th Cir. 1995); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 
(7th Cir. 1985); Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 
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standard.40 
The D.C. Circuit has further explained its analysis of the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard, as applied to a FONSI: 
First, the agency has accurately identified the relevant environmental 
concern. Second, once the agency has accurately identified the 
problem, it must have taken a ‘hard look’ at the problem in preparing 
the EA. Third, if a finding of no significant impact is made, the agency 
must be able to make a convincing case for its finding. Last, if the 
agency does find an impact of true significance, preparation of an EIS 
can be avoided only if the agency finds that the changes or safeguards 
in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.41 
A 2003 Fifth Circuit case, Spiller v. White, provides an example of 
EPA involvement in a FONSI determination.42 Spiller involved a 
gasoline pipeline that had the potential to move 225,000 barrels of 
gasoline per day across Texas.43 The pipeline had been used to transport 
crude oil, but had not been used for several years.44 The EPA and the 
Department of Transportation, acting as co-lead agencies, completed an 
EA and issued a FONSI.45 The Fifth Circuit found the FONSI was not 
arbitrary and capricious, because the EA was comprised of over 2,400 
pages, including expert analysis on pipeline safety, endangered species, 
emergency, response, and other matters.46 The EA incorporated a review 
of over 6,000 written comments from six public meetings, and the court 
found it was “more akin to a full-blown EIS.”47 The FONSI was also 
predicated on the owner of the pipeline agreeing to mitigation measures 
to reduce the potential of adverse environmental impact, referred to by 
 
1996).  N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990). Although the 
Ninth Circuit courts used a “reasonableness” standard in earlier decisions, more recent cases from 
this jurisdiction have applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. Compare Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 
at 1537 (applying a  reasonableness standard) with Pearson, 96 F. App’x at 467 (applying an 
arbitrary and capricious standard); see also Korey A. Nelson, Judicial Review of Agency Action 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act: We Can’t See the Forest Because There are Too 
Many Trees, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 177, 189 (2003).  For a discussion of the rule that a reviewing 
court may look outside of the administrative record in NEPA cases, see Susannah T. French, 
Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1993). 
 40. Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283, 1291 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 41. Town of Cave Creek, 325 F.3d at 327 (quoting Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 753 F.2d 
120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
 42. Spiller, 352 F.3d at 239. 
 43. Id. at 238. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 239. 
 46. Id. at 240. 
 47. Id. at 240-41. 
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the Court as a “mitigated FONSI.”48 The author suggests that this type of 
thoughtful analysis and expert consideration should take place before 
any FONSI is issued. 
The author is not suggesting that mitigated FONSIs are an 
alternative solution to EPA involvement. Problems with mitigated 
FONSIs arise when the lead agency suggests mitigation measures that 
may be sufficient to keep the predicted environmental harm below the 
level of a “significant environmental impact,” thus avoiding the need for 
an EIS.49 Because of the lack of environmental expertise of the lead 
agency, such predictions are rarely accurate.50 The involvement of the 
EPA in drafting an EIS may result in more accurate predictions. 
Mitigated FONSIs lack the analysis of the full range of environmental 
impact, as well as the possible alternatives that would be detailed in an 
EIS. Another problem is that the mitigation measures may never be 
implemented, as NEPA does not require follow-up monitoring. 
At a minimum, the EPA should be required to sign off on a FONSI 
determination, because (a) it is a waste of the resources of our court 
system to require a judgment to force the agency to prepare an EIS; (b) it 
is inefficient to expect non-profit environmental citizens groups to bring 
lawsuits to challenge a FONSI;51 (c) challenges to a FONSI may be 
unsuccessful because of requirements of standing and timeliness; and (d) 
the results of NEPA court challenges are currently politically motivated. 
The inefficiency of relying on private lawsuits to protect the 
environment was recognized decades ago, when the legislature enacted 
environmental laws to replace common law nuisance claims.52 This 
section discusses why EPA approval of FONSI determinations will be 
more effective than reliance on lawsuits by environmental groups for 
protection of the environment. Private lawsuits are less effective because 
issues of standing, mootness, and laches may bar these challenges, and 
 
 48. Id. at 241. 
 49. Bradley C. Karkkainen Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLM. L. REV. 903, 908 (indicating that mitigated 
FONSIs are just another method used to avoid drafting an EIS, and suggesting increased monitoring 
of environmental harm post-EIS, a suggestion which this author strongly supports, notwithstanding 
the inevitable increase in costs and bureaucracy). 
 50. Id. at 928, (stating that “fewer than one out of three verifiable predictions correctly 
forecast both the direction and the approximate magnitude of the environmental impact, while most 
predictions were simply unverifiable, either through fundamental imprecision or for lack of follow 
up data”). 
 51. See generally, Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 106 (2005) (outlining 
advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement). 
 52. See id. at 104. 
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the lack of expertise in preparation of EIS may still be a problem, 
notwithstanding private legal challenges. 
A.  Standing to Challenge NEPA Determinations 
NEPA confers no private right of action.  Therefore, plaintiffs 
challenging a FONSI or the sufficiency of an EIS must prove they have 
standing.53 An environmental group must “demonstrate that its interests 
fall within the ‘zone of interests’ protected by NEPA,” to satisfy the 
prudential standing requirement.54 Additionally, the plaintiff must meet 
the constitutional standing requirements by proving  
(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action 
of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, 
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.55 
In 1990, the Supreme Court held that an environmental advocacy 
group lacked standing in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.56 In 
Lujan, the BLM administered a program that determined which federal 
lands would be available for commercial uses, including mining.57  
Justice Scalia found no standing to permit review of an entire federal 
agency program.58 Justice Scalia further restricted his view of standing 
two years later in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, finding an 
environmental group lacked standing because they failed to prove they 
suffered an injury.59 The court found no imminent injury where members 
of the environmental group hoped to be able to return to observe 
endangered species, because the expected harm to such species was 
merely speculative.60 
 
 53. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2005); 
Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 54. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 885-90. 
 58. Id. at 889. 
 59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
 60. Id. at 564; see also Matthew Porterfield, Agency Action, Finality and Geographical 
Nexus: Judicial Review of Agency Compliance with NEPA’s Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement Requirement After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 619, 619-
20 (1994) (discussing the uncertainty over the implications of Lujan). The Court took a somewhat 
broader view of standing in Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 
173 (2000).  However, that case involved the Clean Water Act, and has not been extended to NEPA 
actions. 
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The Ninth Circuit similarly found a lack of actual injury in Cold 
Mountain v. Garber.61 The U.S. Forest Service issued a FONSI related 
to a permit, granted to the Montana Department of Livestock, allowing it 
to operate a bison-testing facility in the Gallatin National Forest, near 
Yellowstone National Park.62 The purpose of the facility was to ensure 
that bison migrating out of Yellowstone did not carry brucellosis, a 
bacterial organism.63  The FWS issued an Incidental Take Statement, 
anticipating that the facility might cause the reproductive failure of a 
particular nest of bald eagles, a threatened species.64 When a second nest 
of bald eagles failed, environmental groups brought an action alleging 
NEPA violations and a failure to conform to the limitations of the 
permit.65 The Court found that the plaintiff “failed to establish a causal 
link between any alleged hazing violations and the [second] nest 
failure.”66 Involving more environmental expertise in the early stages of 
a FONSI would alleviate this problem of requiring an actual injury to 
provide the plaintiff standing.67 
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in Heide v. FAA.68 
Petitioners attempted to challenge a FONSI issued by the FAA 
approving runway procedures near the petitioners’ homes.69 Because the 
petitioners lived east of the airport, and the record indicated that this area 
would not be impacted by the proposed runway procedures, the court 
found the petitioners had not demonstrated a particular injury and lacked 
standing.70  This need to prove a causal link between the agency’s 
actions and the environmental harm is one more hurdle for the 
environmental groups challenging NEPA violations. The early 
involvement of environmental experts in  FONSI determinations would 
address this, because environmental advocate suits would be a less 
critical environmental protection tool if FONSIs were issued only with 
environmental expertise. 
Another element of standing that must be established by the 
plaintiff is that the agency has taken final action.71 When the state of 
 
 61. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 62. Id. at 887-88. 
 63. Id. at 886. 
 64. Id. at 888. 
 65. Id. at 889. 
 66. Id. at 890. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Heide v. FAA, 110 F. App’x 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision). 
 69. Id. at 725-26. 
 70. Id. at 726. 
 71. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2005). 
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Wyoming challenged the Department of the Interior’s approval of the 
state’s plan for management of the re-introduction of the gray wolf, the 
court found the state had no standing because the defendant’s letter was 
not a final agency action.72 
The NEPA standing requirement contradicts congressional intent 
and creates an unnecessarily complicated hurdle to environmental 
protection enforcement. A better policy would be to grant standing to 
plaintiffs who can prove that they lack the information that NEPA 
requires agencies to provide to the public.73 
B.  Finding of No Significant Impact: Challenged Too Late. 
Environmental groups who attempt to challenge FONSI 
determinations must act promptly.  If the proposed project is completed 
before the challengers file suit, courts are likely to dismiss the challenge, 
notwithstanding a failure to comply with NEPA. Earlier courts often 
refused to find a controversy moot, but more recent courts have been 
more likely to consider a matter beyond review.74 One troubling 
example, Bayou Liberty Assoc. v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, involved the construction of a Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club, and 
Home Depot complex on 60 acres of wetlands in Louisiana.75 The entire 
complex was located in a 100-year flood plain.76 The Army Corps of 
Engineers issued a permit for construction after a FONSI.77 Although the 
court noted that federal, state, and local agencies participated, there was 
no indication of EPA or FWS approval or agreement.78 There can be 
little doubt that paving 60 acres of wetlands would have significant 
environmental impact on water quality and quantity, as well as wildlife 
habitat.79 Because the environmental group only challenged the Corps’ 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Adrienne Smith, Standing and the National Environmental Policy Act: Where 
Substance, Procedure, and Information Collide, 85 B. U. L. REV. 633, 638 (2005) (advocating for a 
theory that an agency harms individual plaintiffs when such plaintiffs are deprived of information 
that NEPA requires agencies to make public, and therefore such plaintiffs have standing). 
 74. See, e.g., Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 591 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (rejecting a mootness challenge); West v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 
925 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a challenge to a completed phase of a freeway interchange project was 
not moot because the project could be modified to reduce environmental impact). 
 75. Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d 393, 395-96 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
 76. Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
No. 98-31260 (5th Cir. June 2, 1999). 
 77. Bayou Liberty, 217 F.3d at 395. 
 78. Id. 
 79. For a discussion of the ramifications of paving large areas and increasing the rate of 
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NEPA process after construction of the retail complex was complete, the 
court found its claims moot and denied relief.80 
Similar to the Bayou Liberty result, the Fifth Circuit declared a 
FONSI challenge moot because construction was complete in Springer 
v. U.S. Marshal.81 A 300-inmate prison was constructed in Texas, at a 
cost of three million dollars, after a brief environmental assessment and 
FONSI determination, with no EIS.82 When the mayor of the city in 
which the prison was located brought an action, challenging the 
environmental assessment as being in bad faith and inadequate, the court 
held the case was moot because “when a construction project is 
complete and operating, plaintiffs can obtain no meaningful judicial 
relief based on alleged non-compliance with NEPA . . . .”83 
The Eighth Circuit recently adhered to the decisions in Bayou 
Liberty and Springer, finding a FONSI challenge moot in One Thousand 
Friends of Iowa v. Mineta.84 The Federal Highway Administration 
reviewed an environmental assessment prepared by the city of West Des 
Moines and the Iowa Department of Transportation regarding proposed 
alterations to a highway interchange.85 Although three sections of the 
interchange were intended to be relocated, the EA only included two.86 
There was no indication that the EPA or any other environmental experts 
were involved in the FONSI. The plaintiffs (an environmental group) 
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a temporary restraining order.  When 
they appealed the decision, the Eighth Circuit found the challenge moot, 
because the proposed action had been completed.87 The court 
admonished the plaintiffs, stating that they could have “avoided this 
result by seeking a stay pending this appeal.”88 The Ninth Circuit has 
also found FONSI challenges moot where construction was completed.89 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach has been more environmentally 
friendly, refusing to find a challenge moot if the court can provide a 
 
runoff, see Wendy B. Davis, Reasonable Use has Become the Common Enemy: An Overview of the 
Standards Applied to Diffused Surface Water and the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 ALB. L. 
ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 4-5 (2004). 
 80. Bayou Liberty, 217 F.3d at 396. 
 81. Springer v. U.S. Marshal, 137 F. App’x. 657, 659 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Richland Park 
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 941-92 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 82. Springer, 137 F. App’x. at 658. 
 83. Id. 
 84. One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 364 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 893. 
 88. Id. at 894. 
 89. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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remedy for failure to comply with NEPA.90 Where an airport runway 
had already been expanded pursuant to an FAA FONSI, the Tenth 
Circuit Court did not find the challenge moot because the court “could 
order that the runway be closed or impose restrictions on its use until 
Respondents complied with NEPA.”91 Similarly, in an earlier case, the 
Ninth Circuit found that, because of the availability of the remedy of 
“undoing” the agency’s sale of an airport, the challenge was not moot.92 
While the above-mentioned courts have found FONSI challenges 
moot, other courts have denied relief based on statutory deadlines or the 
doctrine of laches.93  In Heide v. FAA, the Eighth Circuit recently found 
a petition to review an FAA approval of runway procedures based on a 
FONSI to be untimely.94 Petitioners alleged that that they did not 
become aware of the FAA approval until twelve years after the fact.  The 
court found their claim was barred by a sixty-day deadline for petitions 
for review pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (a).95  A contrary conclusion 
was recently reached by the Ninth Circuit in Ocean Advocates v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, where the court refused to bar the 
action because of laches, finding that the defendant was not able to 
prove a lack of diligence.96 The Court noted that “[l]aches is strongly 
disfavored in environmental cases,” because the “plaintiff will not be the 
only victim of possible environmental damage.”97 To succeed in a laches 
defense, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff lacked diligence in 
pursuing the claim, and that such lack of diligence prejudiced the 
defendant.98 Because new species were added to the threatened species 
lists during the time the permit was being considered, and because the 
defendant had sent letters to the plaintiff indicating that administrative 
remedies might be available, the court found no lack of diligence.99 
Many of these FONSI determinations are made by lead agencies 
without environmental expertise, and the environmental groups that 
attempt to challenge the decisions are thwarted by a failure to act with 
 
 90. Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 91. Id. at 429; see also National Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. FAA, 998 F.2d 1523, 1524 
n.3 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 92. Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 93. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 549 F.2d 1021, 1026-29 (5th Cir. 
1977); Sworob v. Harris, 451 F. Supp. 96, 101-102 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
 94. Heide v. FAA, 110 F. App’x 724, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 862 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 97. Id.; accord City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 678 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 862-63. 
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sufficient promptness to stop the projects. Reliance on environmental 
groups to prevent environmental harm is not effective because these 
challenges may be deemed moot or barred by laches. Prevention of 
environmental damage would be more certain if the EPA were 
consistently involved in the environmental assessment process before a 
FONSI is issued. 
C.  Finding of No Significant Impact: Determination Made Without 
Environmental Expertise. 
NEPA currently allows agencies to determine that their proposed 
projects will have no significant environmental impact without involving 
any environmental experts.  For example, the Federal Transit 
Administration and Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Agency 
issued a FONSI for the construction of a tunnel in Downtown Seattle to 
be used by buses and trains.100 The court found the FONSI was not 
arbitrary and capricious, even though there was no evidence that 
environmental experts were involved in the determination.101 
The D.C. Circuit denied a petition to review an FAA FONSI in 
Town of Cave Creek, Arizona v. FAA.102 The FAA used its own 
methodology to study the noise impact of changes to arrival and 
departure routes at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport.103 
Although the Court noted that the FAA “solicited comments from the 
general public and federal, state, and local agencies,”104 there was no 
evidence that the EPA or any other environmental agency was granted 
cooperating agency status, or participated in any meaningful way. 
Allowing the lead agency that is promoting the project to determine 
environmental risks is like allowing the fox to guard the henhouse. 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in North Carolina v. FAA, held that 
FAA action was not arbitrary and capricious where the FAA adopted the 
U.S. Navy’s environmental assessment and issued a FONSI, 
notwithstanding the suggestions of the FWS that an EIS be prepared.105 
The action involved establishing restricted air space for practice 
bombing by the Navy on the North Carolina coast.106 The Court upheld 
the FAA FONSI even though numerous environmental groups and 
 
 100. Citizens for Mobility v. Mineta, 119 F. App’x 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Town of Cave Creek, Ariz. v. FAA, 325 F.3d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 325. 
 105. North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1133-34 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 106. Id. at 1128-29. 
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agencies indicated environmental concerns. The Fourth Circuit stated, 
“[a]n agency establishing a rule need not respond to every comment.”107 
In California v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, the FWS had also 
requested that an EIS be prepared.  The FAA refused to complete an 
EIS, and instead issued a FONSI; however, unlike the Fourth Circuit in 
North Carolina v. FAA, the Northern District of California found the 
environmental assessment inadequate.108 In California v. U.S. 
Department of Transportation, the Town of Mammoth Lakes intended 
to expand its municipal airport near Yosemite National Park.109 The 
FAA adopted the environmental assessment prepared by the town and 
issued a FONSI.110 Not only did the FWS request an EIS, but numerous 
other agencies and environmental groups, including the National Park 
Service and California Department of Fish and Game, raised concerns 
that were ignored by the environmental assessment.111 The Court found 
that the FAA “unreasonably failed to prepare an EIS” and its 
“conclusion that the project would have no significant impact on 
endangered or threatened species strains credulity.”112  A required sign-
off by the FWS or EPA would have prevented this lawsuit by requiring 
the FAA to prepare an EIS, saving court time and expense. 
The First Circuit found a FONSI was not arbitrary and capricious in 
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. United States Department of 
the Navy.113 The Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit to construct a 
170 foot high data collection tower in Nantucket Sound, for the purpose 
of evaluating a proposal to build a wind energy plant.114  The Corps has 
authority to “prevent obstruction to navigation in the navigable waters of 
the United States . . . .”115 The Corps is charged with issuing certain 
permits only after determining that proposed actions will cause only 
 
 107. Id. at 1135. 
 108. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 260 F. Supp.2d 969, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 109. Id. at 970-71. 
 110. Id. at 971. 
 111. Id. at 972-73. 
 112. Id. at 974, 978.  For a similar case where an FAA FONSI was criticized by a court, see 
Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The FAA issued a FONSI, 
deciding that the construction of a replacement airport near Zion National Park, notwithstanding 
that the plaintiff’s experts alleged that commercial jet overflights of the Park would result in noise 
“4 to 23 times as loud as the natural soundscape.” Id. at 345. The FAA’s experts indicated that “4 to 
15% of visitors. . .would be annoyed by the aircraft” noise. Id. at 344. The Court remanded the case, 
requiring the FAA to evaluate the cumulative noise impact taking into account the data collected by 
the NPS. Id. at 347. 
 113. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 108, 
115-16 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 114. Nantucket Sound, 398 F.3d at 107. 
 115. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (e), (f) (1953). 
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“minimal adverse environmental effects;”116 however, the Corps is not 
an environmental protection agency, and its primary purpose is not 
preservation of the environment or natural resources. The Corps 
completed an EA and issued a FONSI, without approval or formal 
consultation with the EPA or FWS. The court noted there was a public 
comment period, and the Corps conferred with federal and state 
environmental agencies.117 For a project of this scope, a FONSI does not 
appear rational, yet the First Circuit found it was not arbitrary and 
capricious.118 
In another recent case involving an Army Corps of Engineers’ 
FONSI, Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Ninth Circuit found an EIS was required.119 The FWS had expressed 
concerns about the risk of oil spills caused by an oil refinery in Puget 
Sound.120 The Court found that the Corps’ reasons for the FONSI were 
inadequate, where no reasons were stated.121 Once again, a requirement 
of FWS or EPA approval of a FONSI would have prevented this waste 
of court time. 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld a FONSI 
determination in Pearson v. Powell.122 Where the U.S. Forest Service 
prepared a biological assessment that determined that a construction 
project would have no effect on an endangered or threatened species, the 
Court found its FONSI was not arbitrary or capricious.123 The U.S. 
Forest Service was not required to consult with the FWS.124  In Pearson, 
the Forest Service had informally consulted and obtained a letter from 
FWS. These determinations are particularly troubling because, unless an 
environmental group challenges the FONSI determination promptly in 
court, the project may reach a stage where a court will not enjoin the 
action.125 
Lead agencies have attempted to circumvent the requirement to 
prepare an EIS by segmenting the project, so that each section is deemed 
to have no significant environmental impact. This method was used by 
 
 116. 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 117. Id. at 115. 
 118. Id. at 115-16. 
 119. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 875 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 120. Id. at 855. 
 121. Id. at 866. 
 122. Pearson v. Powell, 96 F. App’x 466, 467 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
     125.  See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing issues of mootness and defense 
of laches). 
17
Davis: EPA's Role in FONSI Determinations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
DAVIS1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:15:48 AM 
52 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:35 
the BLM in Hammond v. Norton.126 The BLM was considering a 
pipeline project but analysis of a connected pipeline was omitted from 
the EIS.127 By segmenting the project, the cumulative impact was not 
disclosed.  The Court found the BLM decision to segment the project to 
be arbitrary. 128 The decision of the BLM was contrary to the 
recommendations of the EPA; the EPA “objected to the DEIS . . . 
and . . . raised the issue of ‘segmentation’ . . . .”129 If NEPA were 
modified to require all lead agencies to address EPA objections, this 
lawsuit would have been prevented. 
The foregoing cases illustrate the inefficiencies and waste of court 
time that have resulted when lead agencies ignore the objections of the 
EPA or FWS, requiring judicial action to force the lead agency to avoid 
environmental harm. If the EPA were given more authority in the 
environmental assessment process, prior to issuance of a FONSI or prior 
to finalization of the EIS, such judicial intervention would be 
unnecessary. 
D.  Environmental Impact Statement Preparation and Sufficiency 
The EPA and other environmental agencies should play an 
increased role in the preparation of the EIS. NEPA requires the 
preparation of an EIS when the facts alleged, if true, “show that the 
proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of environmental 
quality.”130  The EIS must include a discussion of the environmental 
impact of the proposed action and any reasonable alternative actions.131 
The lead agency preparing the EIS must  
 
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has 
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any 
environmental impact involved . . . . [S]uch statement and the 
comments . . . shall be made available to the President, the Council on 
Environmental Quality, and to the public. . . .132   
 
 
 126. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 245. 
 129. Id. at 235; see also City of Buffalo v. N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 707 N.Y.S.2d 
606, 613-14 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (finding a state agency had improperly segmented a project and 
therefore a finding of no significant impact under state environmental statute was arbitrary and 
capricious). 
 130. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i), (iii) (2005). 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (2005). 
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Mandating consultation and comments is not the same as requiring 
approval.  Many projects proceed over the protests of the EPA and other 
environmental agencies,133 and many times consultation is never 
requested because the lead agency determines that no significant 
environmental impact is likely.134 Although the EPA has some authority 
to review the final EIS and refer concerns to the CEQ,135 other 
environmental agencies lack such authority. More importantly, this final 
review authority is limited to the information contained in the EIS, 
including the data and analysis prepared by the lead agency. 
Environmental experts may differ on a lead agency’s analysis, testing 
procedures, and data gathering methods; therefore it is important for 
environmental experts to be involved earlier in the EIS preparation 
process. 
The EIS may be drafted by an agency that has neither 
environmental expertise, nor an incentive to evaluate environmental 
impact with any greater concern than economic benefits. Even a 
contractor hired to construct a project has been deemed an appropriate 
party to draft an EIS.136 An appraiser of the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development was deemed to be an appropriate person to 
prepare an environmental assessment and make a FONSI determination 
for a proposed low income apartment project.137  The Navy prepared an 
EIS proposing sonar testing, which has been proven to cause whales and 
marine mammals to die by beaching themselves, without any reasonable 
alternatives included in the EIS.138  This bias and lack of environmental 
expertise is an obvious detriment to a meaningful environmental 
assessment. 
In addition to a lack of environmental expertise in the lead agency, 
another problem with the drafting of the EIS is the use of professional 
 
 133. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Center 
for Biological Diversity v. Fed. Highway Admin., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2003); 
North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding the FAA FONSI despite a 
suggestion by the FWS that an EIS should be prepared). 
 134. See, e.g., One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 364 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Citizens for Mobility v. Mineta, 119 F. App’x 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2004); Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc. 
v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2005). 
 136. Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). 
 137. Richland Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 938-39 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 138. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (N.D.Cal. 2003); see also 
Julie G. Yap, Comment, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship Out of the 
Riptide of National Security,  73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2004) (discussing the balance 
between national security issues and environmental harm). 
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authors, where the lead agency hires a consultant for the purpose of 
paper compliance. The hired expert may be more skilled in paper 
compliance than in the management and mitigation of harm to the 
environment. It is not reasonable to expect a hired contractor to 
undermine the desires of its employer by emphasizing adverse 
environmental harm or criticizing the proposed project.139 
The EIS must consider all foreseeable direct and indirect effects, 
and the consideration given must amount to a “hard look” at the 
environmental effects.140  NEPA has not been applied as a substantive 
statute, and so long as the environmental damage is identified and 
evaluated, the agency is not prohibited from deciding that its goals 
outweigh the environmental costs.141  NEPA “prohibits uninformed—
rather than unwise—agency action.”142  While the EIS must consider 
alternatives to the proposed action, it need not consider all of the 
alternatives, only those that are reasonable in light of the stated purpose 
of the project.143 Courts will defer to the decision of the lead agency, 
requiring challengers to these determinations to prove that they were 
arbitrary and capricious.144 In the leading case of Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,145 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The role of a court in reviewing the 
sufficiency of an agency’s consideration of environmental factors is a 
limited one, limited both by the time at which the decision was made and 
by the statute mandating review.”146 
In the Vermont Yankee case, the Supreme Court upheld the decision 
to license a nuclear reactor, although the hearing conducted in 
preparation of the EIS did not address disposal of the 100 pounds of 
hazardous waste that would be produced annually.147 The Supreme 
Court overturned the Circuit Court of Appeals finding that the rejection 
of energy conservation was arbitrary and capricious, holding that the 
 
 139. See Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of the 
National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVT’L L. 245 
(2000). 
 140. See Communities Against Runway Expansion, 355 F.3d at 685. 
 141. See, e.g., Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 
2001); see generally Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
 142. Custer County Action Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 1034 (citations omitted). 
 143. See, e.g., Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, 69 F. App’x 617, 622 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 144. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
 145. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978). 
 146. Id. at 555. 
 147. Id. at 538. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss1/3
DAVIS1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:15:48 AM 
2006] EPA’S ROLE IN FONSI DETERMINATIONS 55 
agency’s decision must be upheld if the agency employed at least the 
minimum procedures required by the statute.148 Justice Rehnquist 
cautioned the Court against imposing “upon the agency its own notion of 
which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, 
undefined public good.”149 
NEPA does not provide effective protection for the environment.150  
It merely creates a procedural hurdle that wastes agency time and 
resources, with no corresponding assurance that environmental harm 
will be prevented. This problem is particularly apparent when airport 
projects are involved. The FAA has been successful in convincing courts 
that airline safety, convenience, and the prevention of commercial flight 
delays are more important than any resulting damage to the 
environment. Courts have accorded such a high degree of deference to 
the FAA’s determinations that the environmental protection laws have 
been rendered meaningless.151  Whether the goal of airport expansion is 
to prevent delays in commercial flights152 or to provide training 
opportunities for military pilots,153 courts support FAA decisions despite 
significant environmental impact.  For example, courts have upheld 
FAA orders that (1) threatened significant disturbance of livestock or 
migratory birds;154 (2) allowed hundreds of acres of wetlands to be filled 
 
 148. Id. at 548. 
 149. Id. at 549. 
     150.   See generally, Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 3, 5 (2006) (questioning “whether formally including environmental factors in 
decision-making documents, but paying them no real heed, violates the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ 
standard of the APA”). 
  151. Petitioners are often denied a voice in court to review FAA orders, as when the Second 
Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review FAA approval of an airport layout plan in 
Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion v. FAA, 320 F.3d 285, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2003). The court found 
that its jurisdiction was limited to the review of orders with respect to aviation safety duties, and 
that the approval of an airport layout plan fell under a separate part of the statute that did not 
specifically grant jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, leaving jurisdiction  exclusively to the district 
court. Id. at 287. 
 152. See Communities Against Runway Expansion v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 682 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 153. See Lee v. U. S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 154. Id. at 1244; see also Welch v. U.S. Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 802 (N.D. Tex. 2003). 
Welch held the FAA’s order sufficient to satisfy the NEPA requirements.  Id. at 850.  However, in a 
consolidated appeal of three separate challenges to the FAA in this matter, the Fifth Circuit 
abrogated portions of the Welch decision.  Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass’n v. FAA, 
116 F. App’x 3, 7, 10 (5th Cir. 2004).  For example, the Fifth Circuit refused to overturn the lower 
court’s determination that the EIS adequately considered the impact to livestock and birds, but held 
the EIS inadequately addressed the economic impact of low-level Air Force flights on the 
community.  Id. at 10.  The court required the FAA to further study and address this impact in a 
supplemental EIS.  Id. at 16. 
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in;155 (3) created a noise level that was expected to cause some people to 
be “highly annoyed;”156 and (4) increased the noise level at historic 
national parks.157 NEPA would have more of a substantive impact if 
courts gave less deference to the decisions of the FAA and other non-
environmental lead agencies. 
The Fifth Circuit has set forth three criteria to determine whether an 
EIS is adequate: 
(1) whether the agency in good faith objectively has taken a hard look 
at the environmental consequences of a proposed action and 
alternatives; 
(2) whether the EIS provides detail sufficient to allow those who did 
not participate in its preparation to understand and consider the 
pertinent environmental influences involved; and 
(3) whether the EIS explanation of alternatives is sufficient to permit a 
reasoned choice among different courses of action.158 
Even within the this deferential framework, courts should conclude 
that the lead agency did not take a hard look at the environmental 
consequences whenever the appropriate environmental experts were not 
involved.  Alternatively, Congress should amend NEPA to require that 
environmental considerations take priority over concerns of mere 
convenience or economy.159 This balancing of environmental and other 
considerations has policy implications that could be addressed by both 
the legislature and the courts. 
President George W. Bush has sought to undermine even the 
limited impact of NEPA by an executive order.160 The order 
acknowledged the importance of transportation infrastructure projects 
and created an Interagency Task Force within the Department of 
Transportation to assist agencies in expediting environmental review and 
streamlining the process of issuing permits.161 The order undermines the 
NEPA requirement that agencies take a “hard look” at environmental 
impacts. An expedited review is necessarily a more cursory review, 
 
 155. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 235 (Alaska 2003). 
 156. See Welch, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 840. 
 157. See Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 158. Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 159. See generally Sinden, supra note 23 (suggesting the cost-benefit analysis should be 
rejected in environmental issues in favor of a trumping approach). 
 160. Exec. Order No. 13,274, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,449 (Sept. 18, 2002). 
 161. Id. 
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lacking in-depth analysis and reducing the likelihood of an accurate 
prediction of impact.  It is particularly damaging to the effectiveness of 
NEPA considering that the Supreme Court has held that if a statutory 
deadline for a project is too short for an agency to prepare an EIS, then 
no EIS is required.162 The impact of this executive order has yet to be 
realized, but the order, in effect, gives the FAA the opportunity to ignore 
important environmental ramifications for the sake of mere convenience. 
For NEPA to have any real effect, the EPA and other environmental 
experts must be involved in both the EA and EIS preparation. 
E.  Supplementing the EIS 
EPA involvement in supplementing an EIS would also render 
NEPA more effective. Once a final EIS has been filed, additional 
information may become available that changes some aspect of the 
project. If “[t]he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed 
action that are relevant to environmental concerns,” or if there are 
“significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental 
concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts,” a 
Supplemental EIS (SEIS) must be filed.163 The agency is required to 
supplement when “the subsequent information raises new concerns of 
sufficient gravity such that another, formal in-depth look at the 
environmental consequences of the proposed action is necessary.”164  If 
the proposed agency action is implementation of a plan, once the plan is 
in effect, there is no obligation to supplement the EIS because there is no 
proposed action.165 
As in deciding whether to prepare an EIS, the standard of review 
for the decision to supplement the EIS is not consistent among the 
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “arbitrary and capricious” 
is the appropriate standard of review, in Marsh v. Oregon Natural 
Resources Council.166  In Marsh, the Army Corps of Engineers prepared 
a final EIS, as well as a supplement, describing the impact of the Elk 
Creek Dam on fishing, elk and deer populations, and water quality.167 
After construction was one-third complete, environmental groups sought 
 
 162. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 777 (1976). 
 163. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (c) (1); see also Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004); Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 164. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1237 (D. Wyo. 2005) 
(quoting Wis. v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 165. Id. at 1238. 
 166. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1989). 
 167. Id. at 366. 
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review of the failure to file a SEIS reflecting information that became 
available at a later time, indicating the cumulative effects of three dams 
in the Rogue River Basin.168 The Supreme Court decided that the Army 
Corps was not arbitrary or capricious in deciding not to file a SEIS 
because the new information was either not significant, or the portions 
that were significant were not new or accurate.169 The Court also noted 
that “the difference between the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ and 
‘reasonableness’ standards is not of great pragmatic consequence.”170  
The Court described its inquiry as a determination of whether “the 
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and 
whether there has been a clear error of judgment,” requiring the agency 
to take a “hard look” at the new information to determine whether 
supplementation was necessary.171 The Court noted that the First, Fifth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted a reasonableness standard, while 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the arbitrary and capricious standard.172 
Since the Marsh decision, several courts, including the Ninth Circuit, 
have adopted an arbitrary and capricious standard for evaluating the 
decision to supplement an EIS.173 
When the BLM auctioned three oil and gas leases in the Wyoming 
Powder River Basin to extract coal bed methane, relying on existing 
EISs relating to conventional oil extraction, the Tenth Circuit reviewed 
the decision using the arbitrary and capricious standard.174 The Court 
explained that the agency action would be deemed arbitrary unless 
supported by substantial evidence, defined as “such relevant evidence as 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”175  
The Tenth Circuit found that there was substantial evidence that the 
unique environmental concerns of coal bed methane development 
rendered the existing EIS inadequate.176 
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the BLM was able 
to avoid supplementing an EIS by proving that no ongoing major federal 
 
 168. Id. at 368. 
 169. Id. at 385. 
 170. Id. at 377 n.23 (citation omitted). 
 171. Id. at 378 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971)). 
 172. Id. at 377 n.23. 
 173. See, e.g., Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 174. Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 377 F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 175. Id. (citation omitted). 
 176. Id. at 1159.; see generally Wendy B. Davis, Coalbed Methane: Degasification, Not 
Ventilation, Should be Required, 2 APPALACHIAN J. L. 25 (2003) (discussing the environmental 
issues in coalbed methane development). 
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action was proposed.177  The environmental-group plaintiff alleged that 
the BLM failed to manage the increased use of off-road vehicles in 
wilderness areas where use had increased after the approval of a land use 
plan.178 The U.S. Supreme Court found that the approval of the land use 
plan was a major federal action; however, once the plan was approved, 
there was no ongoing major federal action that would require a 
supplement to the EIS.179 As a result, the polluter, and not the agencies 
charged with protection of our natural resources and environment, has 
the power to decide when to update or expand on an EIS. The Author 
suggests that the EPA and other appropriate environmental protection 
agencies should have more authority in these determinations. 
F.  History of NEPA Court Actions 
Prior to the administration of President George W. Bush, the 
decreased priority of environmental concern exhibited by the public and 
environmental advocacy groups was evidenced by the decrease in the 
number of EIS’s filed: from 1,949 in 1971 to only 513 in 1992.180  The 
number of lawsuits related to NEPA decreased from 189 in 1974 to 81 in 
1992.181 This trend was reversed during the first two years of the George 
W. Bush administration, with 137 NEPA suits filed in 2001 and 150 in 
2002.182 It appears that the lack of presidential concern for 
environmental matters has caused a corresponding increase in the 
activism of environmental groups and citizens.  
G.  Impact of the Political Affiliation of the Court 
The political affiliation of the administration that appointed the 
judge deciding the case affects the outcome of NEPA cases. Between 
January 2001 and June 2004, there were 217 federal district court NEPA 
cases, with environmental plaintiffs achieving success 59.2% of the time 
when appearing before a Democrat appointed judge, and only 28.4% of 
 
 177. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 2385 (2004). 
 178. Id. at 2377-78. 
 179. Id. at 2385. 
 180. See Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins and Evolutions, 10 
NATURAL RES. & ENVIRONMENT 3, 71 (1995). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Jay E. Austin, John M. Carter II, Bradley D. Klein, Scott E. Schang, Judging NEPA: A 
“Hard Look” at Judicial Decision Making Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE at 6 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.endangeredlaws.org 
/downloads/JudgingNEPA.pdf  (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 
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the time when appearing before a Republican appointed judge.183 During 
the same period, only 107 NEPA cases were filed with the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals.184  Environmental plaintiffs had a success rate of 
35.3%; however “environmental NEPA plaintiffs were nearly six times 
more likely to prevail before majority Democrat-appointed panels . . . 
than before majority Republican-appointed panels.”185 It is also 
significant to note that in every U.S. Supreme Court NEPA case found 
by this Author, the Court upheld the decision of the federal agency and 
decided against the environmental plaintiffs.186  This is likely due to the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard and the high level of deference 
granted by the Court to agency decisions. 
The administration and the courts should give greater priority to the 
prevention of irreversible environmental harm, regardless of any 
political party affiliation. An increased role in the NEPA process by the 
EPA and other environmental agencies would make the process less 
politically sensitive, by halting the process after EPA objection rather 
than resorting to judicial intervention. 
 
 183. Id. at 8. 
 184. Id. at 9. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (finding that the EIS prepared by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission satisfied NEPA); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 
(1976) (finding that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was not required to 
prepare an EIS before filing a disclosure statement); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) 
(finding that a lead agency has broad discretion to determine when a proposal for action exists); Vt. 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (finding that the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) complied with NEPA); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 
347 (1979) (finding that EIS was not required for appropriation requests by federal agencies); 
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (finding the HUD’s 
decision on location of low-income housing project was not a NEPA violation because 
environmental factors may be outweighed by other factors); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (finding Navy was not required to prepare EIS); Metro. Edison Co. v. 
People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (finding that EIS did not need to address 
psychological health); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 
(1983) (upholding NRC’s environmental analysis); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the government could permit timber harvesting in national 
forest); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (finding that decision not to 
supplement EIS was not arbitrary and capricious); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 
490 U.S. 332 (1989) (finding mitigation measures in EIS were sufficient); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding that NEPA does not provide a private right of action.); Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding  that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
ESA regulation); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (permitting timber sales 
in old growth forests); Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (allowing 
clear-cutting in National Forest, and finding case was not ripe for review); Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (finding that no federal agency action was proposed 
therefore no supplemental EIS was required). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss1/3
DAVIS1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:15:48 AM 
2006] EPA’S ROLE IN FONSI DETERMINATIONS 61 
Of course, industry and modern commerce necessarily have a 
negative impact on the environment and consume natural resources; 
however, a minimization of that harm must become more of a political 
priority.  Global warming, extinction of species, and other dire 
consequences will result unless the legislature, and the courts, give more 
weight to environmental preservation. 
III.  NEPA COOPERATING AGENCIES 
The EPA and other environmental agencies could have more 
influence as cooperating agencies. In preparing an EIS pursuant to 
NEPA, the lead agency proposing the action is required to invite the 
participation of federal agencies, states, local governments, and Indian 
tribes that the agency determines may be affected by the proposed 
action.187 The lead agency is also required to assign preparation of 
portions of the EIS to these cooperating agencies.188 The participation of 
and delegation to these cooperating agencies must be meaningful.  The 
U.S. District Court of Wyoming has found a failure to comply with 
NEPA where the U.S. Forest Service did not provide maps indicating the 
affected areas to the State of Wyoming and other cooperating agencies 
in a timely manner, thus preventing any meaningful participation.189 
Notwithstanding the requirement that agencies be allowed to participate, 
many cooperating agencies merely adopt the findings of the lead agency. 
Such adoption is permitted, so long as the cooperating agency 
undertakes “an independent review of the statement,” and determines 
that the cooperating agency’s “comments and suggestions have been 
satisfied.”190 
This requirement of participation by cooperating agencies does not 
ensure significant protection of the environment.  The lead agency 
proposing the action has the discretion to grant or deny cooperating- 
agency status.191 In addition, the lead agency is not required to give 
weight to the recommendations or opinions of the cooperating agencies. 
The lack of effect of the cooperating agency process is 
demonstrated in a 2003 District Court of Wyoming case.192  The Court 
 
 187. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (a) (1) (2004); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 
1197, 1219 (D. Wyo. 2003). 
 188. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (a) (4), (6); Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1219. 
 189. Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1219. 
 190. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(c); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 
1215 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 191. 40 C.F.R. 1508.5; Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1221. 
 192. Wyoming, 277 F. Supp 2d at 1219. 
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found that the National Park Service, as lead agency, acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in denying ten states the status of cooperating agency, 
because the lead agency did not provide any reason for its decision.193 In 
a later decision, this same court also found a lack of meaningful 
participation where the cooperating agencies were not informed of the 
lead agency’s decision regarding a preferred alternative action before 
preparation of the EIS.194 The National Park Service, as lead agency, had 
decided to ban snowmobiles in national parks, which the court found 
was a “prejudged, political decision.”195 
Where the Federal Highway Administration proposed to construct 
an 11.2-mile toll road that “cuts across the habitat of many endangered 
and threatened species” in San Diego County, the EPA as a cooperating 
agency, expressly stated “we recommend you deny the permit.”196 The 
EPA further noted  
 
there has never been a comprehensive analysis of the number of local 
interchanges needed by the three local entities . . . , nor a 
comprehensive analysis of their proposed siting [sic] such that adverse 
impacts to water of the United States can be avoided and minimized to 
the fullest extent possible.197   
 
Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by the EPA, the federal agency 
with the most expertise in this area, the Southern District of California 
Court found that the Federal Highway Administration’s EIS, which 
recommended completion of the project notwithstanding these concerns, 
contained a “reasonably thorough evaluation,” and therefore the project 
was allowed to proceed.198 This is precisely the behavior that could be 
prohibited if the EPA were given dual authority as lead agency, or more 
of an approval role with veto power. If NEPA is to have any real effect 
as an environmental statute, then the agencies with environmental 
expertise must be given authority to prevent projects that will harm the 
environment.199 
Another example of ignoring the concerns of the EPA occurred 
when the Secretary of the Interior prepared an EIS proposing the leasing 
 
 193. Id. at 1221. 
 194. Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (D. Wyo. 2004). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Center for Biological Diversity v. Fed. Highway Admin, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182, 
1187 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
 197. Id. at 1187. 
 198. Id. at 1187-88. 
 199. See generally, Sinden, supra note 23. 
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of the outer continental shelf for oil and gas deposits, although five 
states and several environmental groups objected to the project.200 In an 
opinion written in part by Circuit Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, the Court found that the EIS failed to include an adequate 
analysis of the cumulative impacts of the program on migratory salmon 
and whales.201 Because the whales and salmon would have to swim 
through different areas “with no respite from the harmful effects” of the 
oil and gas drilling, the court found that the cumulative impacts required 
further analysis, rather than the mere conclusory remarks in the EIS.202 
The EPA had expressed serious concern to the Secretary over the lack of 
cumulative impact considerations.203 If the EPA were given dual 
authority, or the power to veto the proposed action, this lawsuit could 
have been prevented and the court would not have been burdened with 
this decision.  The project would have been curtailed until the EPA was 
satisfied.  The court refused to review other portions of the EIS, finding 
that the Secretary of the Interior’s EIS was adequate on other issues.204 
In a recent case, the Air Force proposed to designate air space in 
Texas for low-altitude maneuvers, including B-52 and B-1 Bomber 
flight training.  The FAA was designated as a cooperating agency, but 
there was no evidence that the EPA, FWS, or any other environmental 
agency was also designated.205 The FAA merely adopted the Air Force’s 
EIS.206 A non-profit group of farmers and ranchers challenged the EIS, 
alleging that the Air Force did not follow its own handbook in 
determining the impact of low-altitude flights on livestock, and ignoring 
the plaintiff’s experts’ opinions on the subject.207 The court deferred to 
the Air Force’s determinations and discretion, even though the Air Force 
data contained significant mistakes.208 The Air Force had mistakenly 
referred to surface wind speeds generated by B-52 aircraft flying at 300 
feet above the ground, relying on data from a Boeing aircraft study that 
referred to surface winds from flights at 30,000 feet above the ground.209 
Although the court remanded for a supplemental EIS on other grounds, 
there was no mention of the need for, or reasonableness of, obtaining the 
 
 200. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 201. Id. at 297-99. 
 202. Id. at 297-98. 
 203. Id. at 298. 
 204. Id. at 318-19. 
 205. Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass’n v. FAA, 116 F. App’x 3, 7 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 206. Id. at 10 n.22. 
 207. Id. at 9. 
 208. Id. at 10 
 209. Id. at 12 n.27. 
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input of the FWS or EPA as to the noise or other impact on livestock.210 
The lack of an environmental agency as a cooperating agency was 
evident in the case of Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.211 
The Federal Highway Administration was the lead agency for a project 
to construct the Suncoast Parkway in Florida.212 The Army Corps of 
Engineers was a cooperating agency, and several state and federal 
groups participated in an “informal partnering process.”213 The U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service expressed concern that the project would impact 
two listed species, the Florida scrub jay and the red-cockaded 
woodpecker, but this agency determined that the project would not 
impact the eastern indigo snake, another listed species.214 The Sierra 
Club was concerned that the project would also impact the Florida 
panther and three plant species, but the FWS determined, via an informal 
consultation, that these species would not be adversely affected.215 The 
court found that the Corps complied with the Endangered Species Act 
and NEPA.216 The filling and dredging of wetlands can be predicted to 
have a significant impact on local plants, animals, and ecosystems, and 
the deference and authority granted to a highway department as lead 
agency in developing an environmental plan is not appropriate. 
Other cases have involved a failure to approve of the proposed 
project by the EPA, as a cooperating or non-lead agency, where the lead 
agency continued to forge ahead with the project and the court approved 
the project notwithstanding the expressed concerns of the EPA.217 A 
stronger role for the EPA as a cooperating agency would prevent these 
results. 
The Author acknowledges that participation of the EPA is not a 
guaranty that all environmental damage will be prevented. The 
participation of the EPA did not prevent potential environmental harm in 
a 1982 Eleventh Circuit case.218 The EPA was a cooperating agency, 
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as lead, in the 
construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project in 
 
 210. Id. at 7 
 211. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 212. Id. at 1216. 
 213. Id. at 1217. 
 214. Id. at 1218. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1223. 
 217. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 468, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Citizens Against Burlington, 
Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 200, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d  226, 
235 (D. D.C. 2005). 
 218. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Zeller, 688 F.2d 706, 708 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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Tennessee.219 The EPA allowed the NRC to begin construction before 
completion of the EIS, notwithstanding a known adverse impact on 
endangered or threatened fish species.220 The Court found that NEPA 
allowed the EPA to approve such preliminary site preparation before 
completion of the EIS process, denying a preliminary injunction sought 
by the Sierra Club and others.221  An enhanced role for the EPA will not 
always curtail new projects, and does not guarantee that no additional 
environmental harm will occur; however, such participation is likely to 
have a beneficial impact on the environment. 
IV.  AUTHORITY OF LEGISLATURE TO DELEGATE DUAL AUTHORITY 
Both Federal and State legislatures have the power to grant dual 
authority to more than one agency.  Therefore, Congress may revise 
NEPA to grant dual authority to the EPA and the appropriate lead 
agency. 
A.  Federal 
Nothing in the U.S. Constitution requires that legislative authority 
be delegated only to a single agency. An investigating agency may 
cooperate and share information with other agencies.222 An example of 
dual authority is where the administrators of the FAA and the EPA are 
required to consult with one another before either approves a testing 
procedure or process inconsistent with the emissions regulations 
pertaining to air pollution caused by jet aircraft engines, and to 
determine whether such action requires rulemaking.223  The EPA 
currently has dual authority with OSHA for investigation of major 
chemical accidents.224   
Another example of dual authority is the cooperation among federal 
agents in investigation of crimes. In a 1986 Southern District of 
California case, many defendants were charged with narcotics-related 
 
 219. Id. at 712. 
 220. Id. at 712-13. 
 221. Id. at 711. 
 222. United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
Notwithstanding this permissible cooperation, an agency may not be used as an information 
gathering arm of another agency. United States v. Lasalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 (1978); 
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 788 F.2d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 223. 14 C.F.R. § 34.3(a) (2004).  See generally, Davis and Clarke, supra note 7. 
 224. Memorandum of Understanding Between EPA and OSHA on Chemical Accident 
Prevention (Dec. 1996), available at Donald Stever, Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous 
Waste, Appendix 7N, 7N-4 (2005). 
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offenses.225 Defendants filed “numerous motions to suppress evidence 
derived from electronic surveillance.”226 The Court held that use of 
agents from agencies other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to monitor communications was permissible, where the FBI was 
given authority to intercept communications in orders.227  
 
While cross-agency cooperation and sharing of federal resources are 
commendable, the ease with which judicial review and approval of 
joint monitoring can be obtained, along with the procedural precision 
demanded in Title III, suggest that cross-agency monitoring based only 
on cross-agency investigative cooperation not be viewed as the 
‘normal’ procedure.228 
 
The Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission were permitted by the D.C. Circuit to investigate possible 
violations simultaneously, where the Court found such dual authority to 
be required for effective law enforcement.229 In criminal investigations, 
dual authority raises additional concerns; where Worker’s Compensation 
Commission attorneys were appointed as assistant prosecutors in 
criminal cases alleging fraud and abuse, the court required that those 
attorneys must not be involved in the civil investigation process of the 
agency, to prevent improper exchanges of information.230 These 
concerns do not arise in civil cases, where exchanges of information can 
lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness. 
The EPA regulates food-safety issues arising from plants that have 
been genetically modified to produce their own pesticide.231  The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) also addresses similar food-safety 
issues for genetically modified plants, which could have resulted in 
inefficient overlap of agency resources; however, the FDA has expressly 
waived its authority in this area.232 
The above examples indicate that dual authority between federal 
 
 225. U.S. v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1531. 
 228. Id. n.15. 
 229. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 230. West Virginia v. Angell, 609 S.E. 2d 887, 894 (W.Va. 2004). 
 231. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (bb) (providing that the potential beneficial or adverse effects of the 
pesticide on human health and the environment must be included in the registration of such plants). 
See generally, Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004). 
 232. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
23,004-05 (May 29, 1992). 
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agencies is permitted and has been effective; nonetheless there are 
admittedly potential problems such as inefficiency and wasted resources. 
The benefits of an enhanced role of the EPA in NEPA far outweigh 
these potential problems. 
B.  State 
States have also considered the issues of dual agency authority. A 
Wisconsin Court held in 1941 that a statute was not rendered uncertain, 
even though two agencies were vested with the same power.  
Notwithstanding that the court recognized that conflict or confusion may 
result from a potential concurrent exercise of the power.233 The statute 
involved the creation and re-definition of school districts.234 The court 
noted that under the statute, any action by the school board would be 
subject, and subordinate, to any conflicting order of the 
superintendent.235 No conflict or confusion had arisen at that time; 
therefore the issue was not before the court.236 
Dual authority is also an issue in state environmental protection 
statutes.237 After NEPA was enacted, twenty-eight jurisdictions adopted 
their own version of environmental impact reporting statutes, sometimes 
referred to as State Environmental Protection Acts or SEPAs.238  Similar 
to NEPA, some state environmental statutes do not require approval of 
state environmental agencies. Instead, they merely require that the 
environmental agencies be allowed to comment. For example, in New 
York, the state environmental agency is allowed to comment, but the 
project may go forward notwithstanding the protests or lack of approval 
of the environmental agency.239 Cooperating agencies that do not have 
jurisdiction to fund, approve, or directly undertake the proposed action 
have “the same ability to participate in the review process as a member 
of the public.”240 An agency that has jurisdiction to fund, approve, or 
directly undertake the action, defined as an “involved agenc[y],” may 
impose substantive conditions following the filing of the final EIS by the 
lead agency, if the conditions are “practicable and reasonably related to 
 
 233. School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Adams v. Callahan, 297 N.W. 407, 415 (Wis. 1941). 
 234. Id. at 411. 
 235. Id. at 415. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Nicolas A. Robinson, SEQRA’s Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPAs in the Sister 
States, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155, 1157-58 (1982). 
 238. See Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing 
Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 436 (2003); Robinson, supra note 237. 
 239. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.11(a). 
 240. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.2(t). 
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impacts identified in the EIS or the conditioned negative declaration.”241 
After these comments and conditions are received, the lead agency must 
issue a written findings statement.242 Environmental plaintiffs may not 
obtain judicial review of a proposed action until after the public hearing 
on the draft EIS and the filing of the final EIS and written findings 
statement.243 Where a neighborhood group argued that a draft EIS was 
deficient, lacking critical analysis to such an extent that meaningful 
comment at the public hearing before the findings statement would not 
be possible, the court found the matter was not ripe for judicial 
review.244 These procedural requirements can prevent effective review 
and comment by environmental agencies and others, as it did in a case 
regarding a New York City subway extension and development of the 
Hudson Yards area.245 
Under the New York statutory framework, it is possible for a 
project to proceed, notwithstanding the protests of the environmental 
protection agencies. For example, in 2004, a town in New York, acting 
as lead agency, approved a subdivision proposal for the construction of 
116 homes.246 The New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (NYDEC) requested an injunction because the project was 
likely to kill or disturb tiger salamanders, a listed endangered species.247 
Although the welfare of the species was considered during the 
environmental review, the town decided to allow the subdivision 
notwithstanding the potential harm.248 The court granted a permanent 
injunction, finding that the NYDEC had authority to prevent any 
activities within 1,000 feet of the pond that would harm the 
salamanders.249 It is a significant waste of state funds and court time to 
require the NYDEC to bring an action in court to carry out its function.  
If the NYDEC were required to approve the EIS, or to have equal 
authority with any lead agency proposing an action, then the project 
 
 241. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.3(b). 
 242. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.11(a). 
 243. Hell’s Kitchen Neighborhood Ass’n v. New York City Dep’t of City Planning, 6 Misc. 3d 
1031(A), 2004 WL 3218419 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 21, 2004) (unpublished decision). 
 244. Id. 
 245. The New York version of NEPA presents another procedural hurdle for plaintiffs, 
requiring that the plaintiff “demonstrate that they stand to suffer an injury that is environmental and 
not solely economic in nature should the agency decision be upheld.” Wall Street Garage Parking 
Corp. v. Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., 5 Misc. 3d 1027(A), 2004 WL 2889747 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County Nov. 3, 2004) (unpublished decision). 
 246. State v. White Oak Co., LLC, 787 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (2004). 
 247. Id. at 334. 
 248. Id. at 335. 
 249. Id. at 334. 
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would have been curtailed without resort to the courts. 
Where a town zoning board granted a variance for development of 
a deer farm without preparation of an EIS, the court granted the 
neighbors’ petition for annulment of the variance because the Town did 
not adequately consider the environmental impact.250 This illustrates the 
need for environmental agencies to be involved in the early phases of 
assessment, in determinations of whether an EIS is required. 
Although there is precedent in New York for the use of co-lead 
agencies for completion of an EIS, there is no requirement that one of 
the co-lead agencies be charged with protection of the environment or 
natural resources.251 The New York State Department of Environmental 
Protection was a co-lead agency with the Department of City Planning in 
a case involving a rezoning and grant of special permits for a 
development project.252 Although a neighborhood group challenged the 
EIS, the court upheld the action.253  Similar to the deference shown to 
federal agencies, New York state courts uphold agency decisions unless 
they are found to be arbitrary and capricious.254   Where a New York 
town did not prepare an EIS but merely a short form environmental 
assessment before approving a subdivision that would expand wetlands, 
the court denied petitioner’s allegations that the town did not effectively 
consider the environmental impact.255 The court found that “the 
Legislature has left the agencies with considerable latitude in 
determining environmental impacts . . . .”256  The court further stated, 
“experts and other interested agencies engaged in lengthy and 
meaningful consideration” of the environmental impacts, therefore the 
decision to not prepare an EIS was not arbitrary.257 
V.  LIMITATIONS ON JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY 
In United States v. LaSalle National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that inter–agency cooperation was proper, unless an agency either 
exceeded its authority or interfered with another agency’s 
 
 250. Fleck v. Town of Colden, 792 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 284-85 (2005). 
 251. Id. (authorizing the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and City Planning Commission 
as co-lead agencies, notwithstanding the requirement in N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §  
617.6 (b) that there be a single lead agency). 
 252. Coalition Against Lincoln West v. City of New York, 86 N.Y. 2d 123, 129 (1995). 
 253. Id. at 128-29. 
 254. Ellsworth v. Town of Malta, 792 N.Y.S. 2d 227, 229 (2005). 
 255. Id. at 230. 
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. 
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responsibilities.258 LaSalle involved two IRS summonses served upon a 
bank and its vice president pursuant to a civil penalty investigation.259 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) later commenced a criminal 
prosecution against the bank and its employee.260 The court found that 
the summonses were enforceable if issued by the IRS in good faith, 
before the recommendation to the DOJ, and if the IRS did not abandon 
the pursuit of civil tax collection.261 EPA involvement in preparing the 
EA will not exceed EPA authority, because environmental protection is 
the mandate of the EPA. Such enhanced involvement of the EPA will 
not interfere with the lead agency’s responsibilities because all federal 
agencies are responsible for minimizing environmental harm pursuant to 
NEPA. 
VI.  PROBLEMS WITH DUAL AUTHORITY 
The sharing of authority between government agencies is not 
without problems. Additional communication between the EPA and the 
lead agency will be necessary if the EPA has an enhanced NEPA role. 
Arguably, such communications could leave a paper trail to assist 
plaintiffs opposing the proposed agency action; however, 
communication among agencies will not result in additional disclosures 
to opposing parties because intra-agency communications and opinions 
are protected from disclosure.262  Courts have held that the purpose of 
this exemption is to foster and encourage cooperation among agencies 
and discussions which would be inhibited if the results of those 
discussions were disclosed.263 This issue should not be determinative in 
enhancing the EPA’s role in NEPA. 
If an agency duplicates the work of another agency, cost 
inefficiencies will result. In addition to the duplicative costs of joint 
authority, a failure to share information may result in undue burden on 
the industry being regulated, and could result in more serious 
consequences when important information fails to reach the party 
capable of preventing harm. For example, the EPA reviews the herbicide 
 
 258. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 17, 1980 (General Dynamics Corp., 
Inc.), No. H-80-29, 1980 WL 1422 (D. Conn. May 19, 1980) (unpublished decision); United States 
v. Lasalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1978). 
 259. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. at 301. 
 260. Id. at 313. 
 261. Id. at 318. 
 262. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149-50 (1975); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. 
Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir.1980). 
 263. Sears Roebuck, 421 U.S. at 150-152. 
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that will be applied to genetically modified plants, but the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), part of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, reviews the genetically modified herbicide-tolerant plants 
themselves, and these two agencies do not coordinate their review.264 
This type of inefficiency will need to be monitored and minimized if the 
EPA’s role in the NEPA process is enhanced. 
Dual authority can be most problematic where the two entities 
having authority reach conflicting conclusions. For example, the 
potential for transgenic cotton to cross with wild cotton in the United  
States was studied by both the EPA and APHIS.  APHIS concluded that 
there was no significant expectation that the two varieties of cotton 
would cross; whereas the EPA found that such a risk existed in southern 
Florida, parts of Arizona, and Hawaii.265 
A New Jersey case provides another example of inconsistent 
conclusions between state agencies.  The plaintiff casino operator 
alleged that the state Department of Community Affairs (DCA) 
construction safety regulations for casinos conflicted with the Casino 
Control Commission’s (CCC) regulations.266 Noting the sensitivity of 
the issue, the court declined to decide, instead remanding the issue back 
to both agencies, stating “[i]f, or when, a true conflict emerges, we are 
confident that the DCA and the CCC will coordinate regulation in the 
overall public interest.”267 If the EPA role in NEPA is enhanced, such 
coordination will be important. 
Conflicting conclusions in the NEPA process could most 
beneficially be addressed by allowing the EPA to require an EIS 
overriding the lead agency’s issuance of a FONSI, thereby granting the 
EPA greater authority than the lead at this stage in the process. After the 
EIS is completed, the lead agency may have greater authority to 
 
 264. Council on Environmental Quality & Office of Science and Technology Policy, Case 
Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean 49, at 17-18 (2001) (stating that although APHIS and 
EPA are working on coordinating efforts, currently there are no formal exchanges between the two 
agencies on this subject), available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study4.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2005). See also Mandel, supra note 231 at 2241. 
 265. John H. Payne, USDA/APHIS Petition 97-013-01P for Determination of Nonregulated 
Status for Events 31807 and 31808 Cotton: Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact (1997), available at http://www.agbios.com/docroot/decdocs/01-290-028.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2005); Zigfridas Vaituzis, Doug, Gurian-Sherman, Chris Wozniak, Robyn 
Rose, Gail Tomimatsu, & Mike Mendelson, EPA, BT Plant-Pesticides Biopesticides Registration 
Action Document IIC10 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/2000/october/brad3 
_enviroassessment.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 
 266. Atlantic City Showboat, Inc. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 751 A.2d 111, 112-13 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 267. Id. at 112. 
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determine which alternative action is best; however, the choice of an 
alternative with predictable adverse environmental impact should be per 
se arbitrary and capricious. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Author suggests that the courts should find any FONSI issued 
by a federal agency pursuant to NEPA to be arbitrary and capricious if 
the EPA has not expressly agreed with the determination.  If courts 
accorded the appropriate level of deference to lead agencies, recognizing 
the lead agency’s lack of environmental expertise, and lack of incentive 
to give priority to environmental concerns, an amendment to NEPA 
would not be required. Because the courts currently use an “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, granting significant deference to lead agencies, an 
amendment to NEPA may be required to give effect to the suggestions 
herein. 
At a minimum, the EPA and other environmental agencies such as 
the FWS and NPS should be involved in the EA, and perhaps have 
authority as co-lead agencies to prepare an EIS and decide whether the 
project will proceed, or which alternative to choose. Although this 
enhanced role of the EPA may require a corresponding increase in the 
EPA budget, this change is necessary to make NEPA effective, and not 
merely a procedural hurdle. Without these suggested changes, NEPA 
creates a burden on regulated projects, requiring lengthy  and expensive 
preparation of EAs and EISs, without a corresponding positive impact 
on environmental protection. Centralization of environmental analysis in 
the EPA should result in greater accuracy and efficiency.  Any potential 
additional costs and bureaucracy of enhanced EPA involvement are 
worth it to carry out the intent of NEPA.  
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